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INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, copying a master or revered teacher has been the 
primary method for all artists—musicians, painters, sculptures, poets, 
playwrights, and the like—to learn their respective crafts.1 Copying and 
modifying the work of venerated artists has also been a traditional point of 
departure for new generations to innovate beyond the achievements of 
their predecessors.2 The Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”3 resulting in our modern 
regime of patent, trademark, and copyright law. Over time, however, this 
artistic tradition of copying has collided with more modern concepts of 
intellectual property rights, especially copyright protections.4 The advent 
of the internet as well as state-of-the-art recording and mixing software 
                                                     
 1. See generally HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE (2d ed. 1997). 
Poetic Influence—when it involves two strong, authentic poets—always proceeds by a 
misreading of the prior poet, an act of creative correction that is actually and necessarily a 
misinterpretation. The history of fruitful poetic influence, which is to say the main 
traditions of Western poetry since the Renaissance, is a history of anxiety and self-saving 
caricature of distortion, of perverse, willful revisionism without which modern poetry as 
such could not exist. 
Id. at 30. 
 2. Id. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 4. See Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the 
Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 1999 (2011). 
Because innovation usually requires some form of creativity as an antecedent, intellectual 
property law generally should also promote, and certainly should not impede, creativity. 
Despite the value of facilitating creativity for intellectual property law . . . the legislative 
and judicial development of intellectual property law has paid remarkably little attention 
to modern knowledge concerning how to promote creativity. 
Id. 
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has vastly increased opportunities to copy, remix, sample, parody, and 
otherwise alter the work of other artists, particularly musicians.5 
This brave new world of opportunity comes with inherent problems 
of line drawing when it comes to addressing similarity in music. For the 
purposes of copyright law, it can be remarkably difficult to determine what 
constitutes creative borrowing versus outright stealing. Despite more 
rigorous modern copyright laws (and their related penalties), the practice 
of copying another artist remains as commonplace as ever in the modern 
music industry.6 In fact, recording and remixing software has made it 
possible to exactly replicate another artist’s finished work, even if the 
exact copy constitutes only one layer7 of a newly composed work by the 
copying artist.8 Is this borrowing act one of inspiration, homage, creativity, 
or theft?9 
While courts have begun to recognize that new artistic works may 
borrow heavily from other artists while still creating a distinct musical 
work,10 the difference between lawfully copying and unlawfully stealing 
material is by no means clear. The transformative fair use doctrine, 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,11 was the 
first real attempt by the Court to grapple with the difficult question of 
legitimate (i.e., “transformative”) borrowing in new works of music. The 
Campbell decision created a regime which established that “[a] derivative 
work is transformative if it uses a source work in completely new or 
unexpected ways. Importantly, a work may be transformative, and thus a 
                                                     
 5. See Guilda Rostama, Remix Culture and Amateur Creativity: A Copyright Dilemma, WIPO 
MAG. (June 2015), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2015/03/article_0006.html [https:// 
perma.cc/Q59R-HK8N]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. A typical remix track contains many “layers” of audio files, repurposed and reprocessed to 
combine with each other in the new track. MartyParty, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About 
Remixes, But Were Afraid to Ask, THUMP (Oct. 4, 2013), https://thump.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
everything-you-always-wanted-to-know-about-remixes-but-were-afraid-to-ask [https://perma.cc/ 
XBC2-2KTR]. 
 8. See, e.g., Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 9. In Cariou, the Second Circuit found that appropriation artist Richard Prince had made a fair 
use of Patrick Cariou’s Yes Rasta photographs in Prince’s Canal Zone painting series by sufficiently 
transforming the original, even though in some cases Prince had used photographs from Yes Rasta in 
their entirety. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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fair use, even when all four of the statutory factors12 would traditionally 
weigh against fair use[.]”13 
More than twenty years after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
transformative fair use has become the predominant test courts have used 
to evaluate cases of copyright infringement in the music industry.14 The 
test’s widespread use has, perhaps inevitably, led to a significant 
broadening in the scope of what copying may pass as a transformative fair 
use.15 In fact, courts have generally concluded that a transformative fair 
use analysis renders most alleged copyright infringements distinct, non-
infringing works from the original.16 While this state of affairs is certainly 
a victory for creative license generally, the transformative fair use inquiry 
is notoriously unpredictable. The inquiry is extremely subjective and 
prone to producing different results depending on the trier of fact in any 
given case of infringement.17 
Musical artists must be free to make art within the widest possible 
parameters (including various forms of appropriation) without being 
viewed as stealing each other’s work, so as not to stifle creativity. This 
article will discuss the implementation and effect of the transformative fair 
use standard for questions of music copyright infringement and propose 
two solutions: Congress should (1) enact a new Fair Use Exception to the 
Copyright Act specifically for music and (2) expand the role of the expert 
musicologist in these difficult and extremely technical music copyright 
cases. Part I will address the origins of the transformative fair use doctrine 
                                                     
 12. The four statutory factors for a finding of fair use are: (1) purpose and character of the use; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and (4) 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107. These factors 
are discussed more in depth later in this Article. 
 13. Understanding Fair Use, U. MINN. LIBS. (2016) (emphasis in original), 
https://www.lib.umn.edu/copyright/fairuse [https://perma.cc/5HK3-7DHR]. 
 14. Jose Sariego, Fair-Use Defense Missing in Music-Sampling Cases, LAW360 (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/863335/fair-use-defense-missing-in-music-sampling-cases 
[https://perma.cc/RVQ5-8X5C] (remarking on the strange lack of a fair use defense being raised in 
modern music-sampling cases). 
 15. See e.g., Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694, 713 (2d Cir. 2013) (Wallace, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
The majority relies on the Seventh Circuit decision in Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy 
Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012), for the proposition that all the Court needs to do to 
determine transformativeness is view the original work and the secondary work and, 
apparently, employ its own artistic judgment. . . . [W]hile I admit freely that I am not an 
art critic or expert, I fail to see how the majority in its appellate role can ‘‘confidently’’ 
draw a distinction between the twenty-five works that it has identified as constituting fair 
use and the five works that do not readily lend themselves to a fair use determination. 
Id. 
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and the first case in which the Supreme Court used the doctrine to find a 
new work was transformative of the original and therefore not a copyright 
infringement. Part II will discuss recent cases in which transformative fair 
use doctrine has been inconsistently applied and will demonstrate its 
resultant shortcomings. Finally, Part III will propose both expanding the 
role of the expert musicologist in these cases and enacting a new fair use 
exception to the Copyright Act specifically for music, which more fairly 
addresses the kinds of creative, distributive, and legal issues facing the 
music industry today. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, in large part, to provide 
further protections to copyright owners in an era where technological 
advances (radio, film, television, sound recordings) had outpaced the 
parameters of the 1909 Copyright Act.18 The Copyright Act was not 
intended to absolutely preclude all uses of previously copyrighted works, 
however. The Act carves out limitations on exclusive rights under fair use 
and provides four factors to use when determining fair use: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.19 
Section 107 of the Act further provides that “[t]he fact that a work is 
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made 
upon consideration of all the above factors.”20 In practice, these four 
statutory factors provide little guidance to courts in making actual fair use 
determinations and frequently lead to differences of opinion between 
judges.21 
The idea of transformative fair use as a helpful judicial gloss on 
section 107 was first posed in the 1990 Harvard Law Review article 
entitled Toward a Fair Use Standard by Pierre N. Leval.22 Judge Leval 
urged courts, which were frequently divided on matters of fair use, to 
                                                     
 18. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476 (1976). 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev’d, 811 F.2d 90 
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); New Era Publications Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 
695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 22. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
2018] Distinctive Sounds 1173 
adopt a new guiding principle of “transformative use” as a “cogent set of 
governing principles . . . soundly rooted in the objectives of the copyright 
law.”23 Judge Leval opined: 
[T]he answer to the question of justification [of fair use] turns 
primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is 
transformative. The use must be productive and must employ the 
quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from 
the original. A quotation of copyrighted material that merely 
repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test; in 
Justice Story’s words, it would merely “supersede the objects” of the 
original. If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds value to the 
original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in 
the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use 
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.24 
Judge Leval’s conception of transformative fair use on its face is 
certainly an idea most artists would agree is an acceptable standard in 
theory. As Judge Leval describes it in the excerpt above, the 
transformative use test ideally allows for both creative manipulation of the 
work of prior artists, giving the material new meaning or purpose, while 
still protecting the rights of the original author.25 Academically, the test 
seems to be a fair method of acknowledging the legitimate interests of 
artists on both sides of an infringement accusation and attempting to 
provide a reasonable method of settling these sensitive disputes. One 
important point Judge Leval’s proposal overlooks, however, is how to 
designate a party adequately equipped to make reliable, fair 
determinations of what transformative actually means in real 
circumstances with real facts. Judge Leval also does not address whether 
this judgment can feasibly be made without passing artistic quality 
judgments; rather, he seems to assume that judges will be able to make 
these determinations without crossing over from law to artistic criticism. 
After the publication of Judge Leval’s article, the actual 
implementation of the transformative fair use standard was far from 
straightforward. In 1994, the Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Supreme 
Court decision was first to make transformative fair use the deciding factor 
                                                     
 23. Id. at 1105. 
 24. Id. at 1111. 
 25. John Hollander, Review, “The Anxiety of Influence,” N.Y. TIMES: BOOKS (Mar. 4, 1973), 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/11/01/specials/bloom-influence.html [https://perma.cc/78PT-
852R] (“Poets and prophets, like magicians, learn their craft from predecessors. And just as magicians 
will invoke the real or supposed source of an illusion as part of the patter . . . the most ambitious poets 
also take some stance about sources in the past, perhaps for an analogous purpose.”). 
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to find that copyright infringement had not occurred.26 In this case, Acuff-
Rose Music, the company that held the copyright to Roy Orbison’s rock 
ballad “Oh, Pretty Woman,” sued the members of a rap group for 
copyright infringement.27 The rap group, 2 Live Crew, had produced a 
song called “Pretty Woman,” which they claimed was a commercial 
parody of the original work.28 The Court was tasked with determining 
whether 2 Live Crew’s song was fair use within the meaning of section 
107 of the Copyright Act.29 
The Court held that the commercial value of the song parody did not 
create a presumption against fair use, and it also adopted Judge Leval’s 
transformative fair use analysis.30 So-called transformative fair use occurs 
when a new work does not merely supersede the original but alters the 
original work with “new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other 
words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’”31 
Additionally, the Court stated that “the more transformative the new work, 
the less [significant the] other factors, like commercialism . . . may weigh 
against a finding of fair use.”32 
Artistic works that parody other works have obvious transformative 
characteristics.33 The Court reasoned in this case that “[p]arody needs to 
mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the 
creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire 
can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act 
of borrowing.”34 The Campbell Court, however, was concerned that its 
decision should not be read as an invitation for future courts to engage in 
musical or artistic criticism or questions of taste. The parody versus satire 
analysis was not to be taken as a judgment of whether the new work was 
artistically valuable or not. Rather, “[t]he threshold question when fair use 
is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may 
reasonably be perceived. Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good 
taste or bad does not and should not matter to fair use.”35 
In this case, the Court found that 2 Live Crew’s song could 
reasonably be considered a commentary or criticism of the original song: 
in an effort to contrast the naiveté of the original era with the grittiness of 
                                                     
 26. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 578. 
 31. Id. at 579 (citing Leval, supra note 22, at 1111). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 580–81. 
 35. Id. at 582. 
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modern life on the street, 2 Live Crew juxtaposed the romance of the 
original song with jeering and crude sexual comments.36 The Court found 
that “[i]t is this joinder of reference and ridicule that marks off the author’s 
choice of parody from the other types of comment and criticism that 
traditionally have had a claim to fair use protection as transformative 
works.”37 
The Court went on to determine that, though 2 Live Crew had copied 
the opening base riff and a substantial portion of the lyrics, these 
quotations, which go to the “heart” of the original (a finding that usually 
weighs against fair use), did not amount to infringement because this 
feature “most readily conjures up the song for parody, and it is the heart at 
which parody takes aim. Copying does not become excessive in relation 
to parodic purpose merely because the portion taken was the original’s 
heart.”38 
A few years after the Campbell decision, in another calculated 
attempt to update copyright law for a new technological era, Congress 
enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995.39 
This Act created the first limited public performance right in sound 
recordings within American copyright law.40 Under the Act, the public 
performance right only covers digitally transmitted performances and is 
subject to an exemption for digital broadcasts.41 
Continuing its attempts to bring copyright law up to speed with new 
digital technology, Congress then enacted the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998.42 This law enacted two 1996 World 
Intellectual Property Organization treaties (the Copyright Treaty43 and the 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty44) and provided additional guidance 
on important matters of copyright in the digital era.45 
Title IV of DMCA is of particular interest to the music industry. It 
contains exceptions to section 112 of the Copyright Act for making 
ephemeral recordings and for “webcasting” of sound recordings on the 
                                                     
 36. Id. at 583. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 588–89. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 43. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/94, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295157 [https://perma.cc/P4CZ-EMUK]. 
 44. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, CRNR/DC/95, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295477 [https://perma.cc/7QKJ-AQYH]. 
 45. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 1 (1998), https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5YVJ-S256]. 
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Internet.46 An “ephemeral recording” is made to facilitate a transmission, 
such as a radio broadcast or streaming.47 Under the exemption, for 
example, “a radio station can record a set of songs and broadcast from the 
new recording rather than from the original CDs.”48 Prior to the DMCA, 
section 112 only permitted a transmitter to make and keep (for just six 
months, therefore “ephemeral”) a single copy of a work so long as the 
transmitter was already entitled to transmit a public performance or 
display of the work.49 
These copyright innovations of the late 1990s indicated 
congressional willingness to reimagine the Copyright Act in light of new 
advances in digital technology. These updates to the law were promising 
to artists looking to continually innovate in the digital music space, 
inspired by the work of other artists, without being accused of copyright 
infringement. In the courts, the transformative fair use inquiry continued 
to develop and shape copyright law as it was applied to more cases. 
II. CRITIQUE 
While the Court’s application of the transformative fair use standard 
in Campbell is certainly creative and ground-breaking, the inquiry twenty 
years later has become too broad. The application of the doctrine with time 
has also become inexact and inconsistent: while some courts pardon as fair 
use many works that are almost blatant instances of artistic stealing, they 
also label as infringement works that are likely acceptable fair use.50 
A. Blurred Lines: Has the Transformative Use Test Gotten Out of 
Hand? 
A prime example of this inconsistency in the application of the 
transformative fair use inquiry is the 2015 “Blurred Lines” case (Williams 
v. Bridgeport Music, Inc.) which held that copyright can protect not just 
sheet music but additionally a rhythmic “groove,” expanding protections 
for the original work and creating a higher bar for the possibly infringing 
work to meet before being considered fair use.51 
                                                     
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 14. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). 
 50. See Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding through a transformative fair 
use inquiry that copying the entirety of an original work may constitute a fair use if the original is 
sufficiently transformed). Contra Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK 
(AGRx), 2015 WL 4479500, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015), affirmed Williams v. Gaye, No. 15-
56880 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding through a transformative fair use inquiry that something as elemental 
as a rhythm and blues “groove” could be infringed). 
 51. Williams, 2015 WL 4479500, at *1. 
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In 2015, the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California decided a case which suggested that a musical/rhythmic 
“groove” may be protected by copyright in addition to sheet music.52 
In Williams, Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke, writers of the 2013 song 
(appropriately titled) “Blurred Lines,”53 brought suit against the children 
of singer-songwriter Marvin Gaye, who owned the copyright to Gaye’s 
song “Got to Give It Up,”54 seeking declaratory relief.55 The plaintiffs 
claimed that the Gaye family believed that the song “Blurred Lines” 
infringed their copyright on “Got to Give It Up,” and sought a declaration 
from the court that “Blurred Lines” did not infringe the copyright in the 
earlier song.56 The Gaye family countersued.57 
The jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Pharrell 
Williams and Robin Thicke’s song “Blurred Lines” had infringed the 
copyright of the Gaye family on “Got to Give It Up.”58 This finding was 
undoubtedly influenced by statements both Williams and Thicke had made 
to the press before writing “Blurred Lines” that they were inspired by “Got 
to Give It Up” and were thinking of writing a song based upon it.59 
Additionally, and no doubt also very persuasively, the jury was permitted 
during trial to listen to master recordings of both works.60 This made it 
possible for members of the jury to take note of many production 
similarities between the compositions.61 
No matter what piece of evidence the jury found most persuasive, in 
the end it awarded the Gaye family hefty damages.62 This award was met 
with a fair amount of shock and incredulity in the music industry.63 This 
disbelief was based in “the idea that the court had found that paying 
homage by imitating the ‘feel’ and/or ‘vibe’ of a previously released 
                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. PHARELL WILLIAMS & ROBIN THICKE, BLURRED LINES (Star Track Recordings 2013). 
 54. MARVIN GAYE, GOT TO GIVE IT UP (Motown Records 1977). 
 55. Williams, 2015 WL 4479500, at *1. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at *12. 
 60. Megan Coane & Maximillian Verrelli, Blurring Lines? The Practical Implications 
of Williams v. Bridgeport Music, LANDSLIDE, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Jan.–Feb. 2016), http://www. 
americanbar.org/publications/landslide/2015-16/january-february/blurring_lines_the_ 
practical_implications_of_williams_v_bridgeport_music.html#6 [https://perma.cc/J62Z-6NJ2]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Williams, 2015 WL 4479500, at *47–48 (awarding actual damages of $3,188,527.50, 
awarding Williams’s profits in the amount of $357,630.96, and awarding an ongoing royalty of 50% 
of songwriter and publishing revenues of “Blurred Lines”). 
 63. See Tim Wu, Why the “Blurred Lines” Copyright Verdict Should Be Thrown Out, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/why-the-blurred-lines-
copyright-verdict-should-be-thrown-out [https://perma.cc/CSB6-4L36]. 
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master recording, and more generally genre, was found to be 
infringement.”64 Typically, “feel” and “vibe” elements from a recording 
are not considered by juries in infringement cases because sound 
recordings are generally inadmissible65 as evidence.66 As it stands, the 
ruling in this case seems to suggest—contrary to hundreds of years of 
artistic tradition67—that being inspired by, or paying homage to, a previous 
artist or genre of music inevitably amounts to copyright infringement, or 
(perhaps more cynically) it amounts to infringement when an artist 
announces to the press the intention to create a work inspired by someone 
else. Limiting artists’ freedom to take inspiration from each other, based 
on a single jury’s finding that the new work was insufficiently 
“transformative,” hardly seems to further the goal of promoting “the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”68 Instead, it expressly limits this 
progress when it admittedly rests on the shoulders of prior artists. 
The ruling in the “Blurred Lines” case, while founded on a 
transformative fair use analysis, arguably runs afoul of other aspects of 
copyright law. Under U.S. copyright law, while fixed expression is 
protectable,69 the underlying ideas are not.70 This means that while authors 
are free to artistically express themselves on any given subject, then obtain 
copyright protection over that expression, they are not entitled to copyright 
protection over the subject itself.71 The First Amendment protects the 
rights of non-copyright holders to speak about ideas that copyright holders 
may have previously used as the basis for their protectable expression.72 A 
musical “groove” like the one at issue in the “Blurred Lines” case might 
                                                     
 64. Id. 
There is no question that Pharrell was inspired by Gaye and borrowed from him; he has 
freely admitted as much. But, by that standard, every composer would be a lawbreaker. 
The question is not whether Pharrell borrowed from Gaye but whether Gaye owned the 
thing that was borrowed. And this is where the case falls apart. For it was not any actual 
sequence of notes that Pharrell borrowed, but rather the general style of Gaye’s songs. That 
is why “Blurred Lines” sounds very much like a Marvin Gaye song. But to say that 
something “sounds like” something else does not amount to copyright infringement. 
Id. 
 65. See FED. R. EVID. 1002. The “best evidence rule” typically allows for only the original copy 
of a work to be admissible as evidence. 
 66. Coane & Verrelli, supra note 60. 
 67. See BLOOM, supra note 1. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990). 
 70. Id. § 102(b); Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone, 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (holding 
telephone numbers and addresses in a telephone directory were not protectable by copyright); 
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding scenes a faire—certain 
characters, locales, backgrounds, or events synonymous with covering a certain topic—were not 
protectable by copyright). 
 71. See discussion, supra note 70. 
 72. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2018] Distinctive Sounds 1179 
very easily be considered an underlying musical idea: a groove is “a 
pronounced enjoyable rhythm,”73 serving as a rhythmic, often 
repetitive, foundation for a musical work. Grooves are often 
synonymous with musical “feel,” and are frequently aimed at 
eliciting a rhythmic response from listeners like foot-tapping or 
dancing. Most genres of popular music have readily identifiable 
“grooves” or isolated rhythms that immediately place a particular work 
within a recognized genre such as rhythm & blues, Latin, funk, etc. To 
allow individual artists to have copyrights over these rhythms would not 
only be an impermissible grant of copyright over an idea, but it would also 
spell disaster for the creativity of the music industry, especially when the 
transformative fair use analysis is so inexact and so dependent on the jury 
in any given case. 
But what does the “Blurred Lines” case really mean for the ongoing 
employment of the transformative fair use test? Is the standard becoming 
stricter, more likely to find infringement, or is this particular case a unique 
ruling? How much musical material is now at risk of being labelled 
infringement because it calls to mind a previous song in a similar genre or 
style in the mind of an untrained juror? Are music copyrights now limited 
to the finite number of “grooves” possible to compose? 
Music and entertainment lawyers have debated the significance of 
the “Blurred Lines” decision.74 While some saw the ruling as a damper on 
burgeoning creativity, others read the verdict as an anomalous instance in 
which a music copyright case actually went to trial and a sympathetic jury 
awarded considerable damages.75 The problem this case definitely 
highlights, however, is that the transformative fair use test is too inexact 
in the hands of any given fact-finder without the required music education 
to make reliably fair determinations that both maximize artistic freedom 
and protect the legitimate rights of music copyright owners. 
B. Is the Transformative Fair Use Test Jury-Friendly in Complex 
Music Copyright Cases? 
Music copyright experts have long identified the intrinsic problems 
with allowing juries to make factual determinations in this complicated 
and nuanced area of law. In their article for the American Bar 
Association’s Intellectual Property Law Section’s publication, Megan 
Coane and Maximillian Verrelli point out that there is an inherent 
difficulty in allowing complex issues of fair use in a specialized field to 
                                                     
 73. Groove, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/groove [https://perma.cc/EZH5-KTF9]. 
 74. Coane & Verrelli, supra note 60. 
 75. Id. 
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go to a jury.76 Music copyright is just such a specialized field: not only are 
most jurors not at all familiar with copyright law—an incredibly 
complicated framework of statutes, case law, and international treaties—
they might be even less familiar with music theory and music history.77 
Potential jurors may also be tone deaf, unable to read printed music, 
rhythmically challenged, or simply apathetic. 
In any jury trial, the jury depends on the judge (with the help of the 
litigants) to provide appropriate instructions on the applicable law, as well 
as how the jury may consider the evidence before it.78 Problems inevitably 
arise, however, when the judge in a given matter does not possess the 
requisite musical knowledge to pass reliable, fair, and consistent 
instructions along to a jury (that may or may not be able to use that 
knowledge effectively).79 Coane and Verrelli correctly point out that, 
“[l]ike a recipe, the instructions contain the steps the jury should follow, 
along with questions it should resolve and the criteria it should use. But if 
a judge’s recipe is bad, it’s likely that the cake—the jury’s decision—will 
be bad, too.”80 
Of course, juries in any type of case, criminal or civil, are 
unpredictable by their very nature. In some areas of law, “the issues have 
been taken from the jury for being too difficult for anyone but an expert to 
understand.”81 Issues in music copyright cases, though incredibly intricate, 
are not typically considered quite complex enough to meet that threshold, 
with courts usually leaving questions of infringement and damages in the 
hands of the jury despite their complexity.82 
But is music copyright infringement, with all its complexities, really 
a matter that can be adequately explained—within the time it takes to try 
a case—to a jury unfamiliar with music theory, music history, and 
copyright law to the point where that jury can reliably render a fair verdict? 
These tasks are prohibitively difficult and would require hours of expert 
testimony to “teach” a jury what to look and listen for in an already highly 
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contested area of scholarship, a project that arguably wastes valuable time 
and resources.83 
In copyright infringement cases where a fair use defense has been 
raised, juries must determine (1) whether copying did occur, and if so, (2) 
whether the copying was legally improper. “In copyright law, the second 
criterion can get very fuzzy. With such unhelpful names—‘substantial 
similarity test’ or ‘improper appropriation’—the judge essentially asks the 
jury to determine whether the copying of protected elements was ‘too 
much.’”84 Unfortunately, most jurors, inexperienced in music, are not 
going to approach these cases with a mind to preserving artistic freedom 
or identifying legitimate and intentional acts of music copyright 
infringement. They are far more likely to make an infringement 
determination based on a “gut” feeling and to be motivated by a desire to 
end deliberations and return to their own lives as quickly as possible.85 
Arguably, the first question before a jury in an infringement case—
whether copying has occurred at all—is also likely to be beyond the skill 
set of a jury uneducated in music. Armed only with the testimony of 
experts, it is unlikely that juries with no other musical training will be able 
to make a fair and reliable determination of whether outright copying has 
actually occurred, or whether two songs within the same genre bear a 
passing similarity to each other. “Anytime you go to a jury, you are taking 
a crap shoot of what they will understand and get out of the 
testimony. . . . You could have the musicologist testify for hours and 
hours, and at the end no one will know which way is up.”86 This situation 
does not bode well for any of the parties involved in music copyright 
litigation. Even assuming the transformative fair use test is a good and 
reliable one with which to analyze fair use defenses, a jury—lost in hours 
of expert musicology testimony that it lacks the expertise to understand—
is not an adequate safeguard of artists’ freedom or music copyrights. 
The “Blurred Lines” case has been roundly criticized from all angles, 
primarily because the case seemed to expand the rights of music copyright 
owners far beyond what they were previously understood to encompass. 
Peter Oxendale, a prominent British forensic musicologist involved as an 
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expert in the case, finds the verdict completely ridiculous and expected it 
to be overturned on appeal.87 “Those songs only share a groove. A jury 
can say the sky is green, but that doesn’t mean it is.”88 Given the limited 
style characteristics most popular song writers and producers employ to 
produce a marketable sound, sharing a so-called “groove” is in fact very 
common. Songs in the same genre, i.e., rhythm and blues, rap, etc., are 
likely to demonstrate their place in that genre with very recognizable 
characteristics and references.89 
As such, the average listener, someone untrained in music theory or 
music history, may hear similarities between musical works even when no 
foul play has occurred.90 Joe Bennet, a forensic musicologist at Boston 
Conservatory of Music, explains that in the popular music sphere, “[m]ost 
songwriters follow a strict set of rules—songs being three to four minutes 
long or having four beats to a bar—so there is actually much scope for 
similarity. But the truth is that many songwriters do use other people’s 
music for inspiration.”91 Musical artists may depend on the creativity of 
others for inspiration, as well as to mimic the same qualities that make a 
particular type of song a hit, without nefarious or infringing intentions.92 
There is only so much variety a composer can work with when a 
particular genre or audience has very clear expectations of how a song 
ought to sound. While society may be taken with the romantic myth of 
creative inspiration, “every songwriter is partly a product of their 
influences. Allowing yourself to be influenced by a song—just not 
copying the melody, chords or lyrics—is perfectly fine.”93 In a nutshell, 
the combination of original creativity and outside influence is the core of 
what musical composition actually is.94 In fact, “[many] famous songs 
have been created using reference tracks and there’s nothing wrong with 
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that. . . . [t]here would be no Beethoven without Haydn.”95 A demand that 
every piece of newly composed music be absolutely and entirely original 
would not only be completely unfeasible, it would also discount all the 
good art made as a result of inspiration from another artist. 
C. The Modern State of Copyright Law is Over-Protective 
Two predominant narratives have emerged to explain the modern 
direction and growing depth of copyright law. One explains the need for 
complex laws in the area “as a way to ensure an adequate revenue stream 
for copyright owners as technologies change and business models shift.”96 
This view is held by music publishers and other behemoths of the music 
industry looking to protect their business models in an age where almost 
any piece of music can be found somewhere on the internet by looking 
hard enough. The other narrative sees the current copyright regime, 
“particularly those changes put in place by Congress in the last twenty 
years, as protecting incumbent businesses from the full-throttle 
competition of the digital age.”97 It is little wonder that artists get caught 
in the middle of this fight between the music industry and new media. 
In a generation where music becomes more and more heavily 
influenced by sources, genres, and works from all over the world, it is also 
important to preserve the musician/performer/composer’s ability to 
borrow extensively as a form of creativity. This is especially true in the 
case of so-called “mash-ups”—musical works formed from a collection of 
elements gathered from previous works, layered together to form a new 
work. Uncertainty in the changing nature of copyright law and sky-high 
licensing costs “have pushed this genre underground, stunting its 
development, limiting remix artists’ commercial channels, depriving 
sampled artists of fair compensation, and further alienating netizens and 
new artists from the copyright system.”98 In order for copyright law in the 
United States to fulfill its commission to promote the arts, Congress must 
develop a better way to facilitate the creativity of artists at the forefront of 
new music, rather than prioritizing the interests of established industry 
stakeholders. There must be a more satisfying “resolution of the trade-offs 
among authors’ rights, cumulative creativity, freedom of expression, and 
overall functioning of the copyright system.”99 Our current system 
underperforms. 
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Recent case law proves encouraging in this particular arena. In a case 
where sampling was at issue, the Ninth Circuit recently found that 
Madonna Louise Veronica Ciccone and her producer had not infringed 
copyrighted material by sampling short horn riffs (lasting less than a 
second) into her iconic song “Vogue,” emphatically rejecting the Sixth 
Circuit’s 2005 bright-line rule that all unlicensed sampling constitutes 
copyright infringement.100 Madonna and her legal team did not bother with 
raising a fair use defense in the case.101 
III. PROPOSAL 
It is important to evaluate all aspects of a piece of music—score, 
recording, etc.—before making a fair use determination. The testimony of 
expert musicologists and theorists is critical for maximum understanding 
of the issues, for accuracy, and for fairness. Only an expert can tease out 
important distinctions between musical ideas and musical expression—
what is merely inspired by a particular artist versus what is directly copied. 
The role of the jury in music copyright infringement cases must be 
significantly minimized. Jury verdicts are inherently problematic because 
of the incredibly specialized knowledge required to make fair use 
determinations. It is very likely impossible to bring juries “up to speed” 
over the course of a music copyright infringement trial in order to enable 
them to make fair and just decisions about whether musical copying has 
occurred and whether it is lawful under the fair use exception or not. 
Comparing any two musical works involves the ability to conduct a 
stylistic analysis of many different musical features, not just “vibe” and 
“feel” as in the Blurred Lines case, but chordal progressions, melodic and 
harmonic lines, articulation and phrasing markings, text, meter, tempi, and 
many, many other factors. The ability to recognize copying of any number 
of these features is, in fact, a very high-level exercise for which extensive 
specialized training is required. A musically uneducated jury simply 
cannot make these nuanced determinations when even the most 
experienced musicologists may disagree over what types of stylistic 
similarities or confluence of similarities more strongly suggest music 
copyright infringement. 
Given the profound changes since the 1976 Copyright Act, not only 
in music itself, but also the ways it is produced, distributed, and 
incorporated into new works, it seems only logical to create a new 
copyright fair use exception specifically for music. The transformative fair 
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use analysis began down the path to this conclusion, but rather than 
sufficiently adapting the existing Act into a workable solution, it 
ultimately further complicated music copyright infringement questions by 
requiring inexperienced juries to do too much musical analysis, resulting 
in unfair and inconsistent verdicts. 
It is also patently ridiculous to assume that the same Act and set of 
analytical tools can be applied to works of literature, photography, 
painting, film, and many other art forms as are applied to music (in both 
its recorded and written form) in order to determine whether copyright 
infringement has taken place. These art forms are all unique, not only 
because they produce distinct artistic products but because the culture of 
artistic copying, for learning purposes as well as an artistic choice, is 
unique to each discipline. While the multi-million-dollar popular music 
industry may care very much about setting clear rules for what is 
“inspiration” versus what is stealing, the visual arts may be far less 
interested in this inquiry and more interested in another facet of intellectual 
property law. 
Some level of protection is needed in order to provide an incentive 
for the creation and distribution of works of authorship. How much 
protection is the fundamental question. When elements of the 
copyright system hinder dissemination of copyrighted works without 
providing adequate benefits to the creators or distributors of works, 
those elements of the system should be eliminated. The Copyright 
Act is no longer responsive to the reality of the digital world.102 
Some critics of the Copyright Act have even suggested doing away 
with it altogether.103 
A new Music Copyright Fair Use Exemption would necessarily 
contain the following provisions: 
1. Style feature comparisons, including analysis of rhythm, meter, 
harmonic structure, tempi, articulation, instrumentation, etc., 
enabling the court to find infringement more likely in cases 
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where a significant number of style features overlap (in the 
absence of parody). This provision would be by far the most 
probative, and expert musicologists would be absolutely 
necessary to this portion of the analysis. 
2. Mixed media questions tending to indicate fair use, i.e., 
a. Is the new work in a different media than the preexisting 
work? 
b. Does the new work employ the original media but also 
add new media? 
c. Is the original’s media particularly significant to the 
essence of the original work? Does the new work merely 
emulate that essence or instead attempt to exactly 
replicate it? 
d. Do initial drafts of the alleged infringing work include 
less of the original work than the final version? 
3. Remix provisions establishing more permissive “ground rules” 
for sampling, altering, and layering the work of other artists, i.e., 
allowing direct copying where the sampled original work 
becomes an entirely new artistic expression (essentially, 
transformative fair use in the context of sampling). 
4. Extra-musical factors that lead to a finding of infringement, for 
instance: 
a. Testimony indicating the creators of the new work 
resorted to direct “copy and pasting” without any intent 
to pay homage, create a parody, or otherwise reinvent 
aspects of the original work. 
b. Evidence the infringing parties relied extensively on 
scores or sound recordings of the original work, 
especially if the infringing parties made copies of the 
original’s scores or sound recordings during the 
composition process. 
This more in-depth analysis will not only better answer questions of 
infringement but allow creative musical artists to borrow with more 
freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
The transformative fair use standard has expanded in a way that 
makes cases of fair use in music too unpredictable and unfair. While the 
transformative fair use test was the first important step away from the 
original four factors test of section 107—which has become increasingly 
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unhelpful in the digital music age—the transformative fair use test itself 
has eventually complicated rather than solved the original test’s problems. 
This uncertainty both hampers creativity and gives copyright holders of 
music legitimate cause to worry about the true scope of their rights. 
Because similarities in musical works can be extremely hard to 
quantify, music copyright infringement cases need a better system for 
characterizing those similarities legally so that fairer outcomes are reached 
more frequently by courts. It is extremely unlikely that a jury with no 
musicological experience would be able to weigh in fairly on these 
complicated matters that divide expert musicologists. 
The most workable solution is a new fair use exemption to the 
Copyright Act specifically for music to clarify the rules. This new 
exemption would codify by statute the sorts of music-specific 
considerations to be weighed when making a fair use determination. There 
must be an expanded role for the expert witness in cases of music 
copyright infringement or transformative use defenses. Only experts can 
tease out subtle but important differences between original and secondary 
works, thereby increasing artistic freedom while preserving the rights of 
established artists. Judges should not be art critics, but musicologists are, 
and they should also be called upon to fill that role in court when 
necessary. The Copyright Act should be amended to include a more 
precise definition of infringement in the music space, including style 
features, expanding the role of the expert witness, and diminishing the 
importance of the jury. 
